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a b s t r a c t 
We consider supplier development decisions for prime manufacturers with extensive supply bases pro- 
ducing complex, highly engineered products. We propose a novel modelling approach to support supply 
chain managers decide the optimal level of investment to improve quality performance under uncertainty. 
We develop a Poisson–Gamma model within a Bayesian framework, representing both the epistemic and 
aleatory uncertainties in non-conformance rates. Estimates are obtained to value a supplier quality im- 
provement activity and assess if it is worth gaining more information to reduce epistemic uncertainty. 
The theoretical properties of our model provide new insights about the relationship between the degree 
of epistemic uncertainty, the effectiveness of development programmes, and the levels of investment. We 
ﬁnd that the optimal level of investment does not have a monotonic relationship with the rate of ef- 
fectiveness. If investment is deferred until epistemic uncertainty is removed then the expected optimal 
investment monotonically decreases as prior variance increases but only if the prior mean is above a 
critical threshold. We develop methods to facilitate practical application of the model to industrial deci- 
sions by a) enabling use of the model with typical data available to major companies and b) developing 
computationally eﬃcient approximations that can be implemented easily. Application to a real indus- 
try context illustrates the use of the model to support practical planning decisions to learn more about 
supplier quality and to invest in improving supplier capability. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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m  1. Introduction and industrial motivation 
Our research is motivated by engagement with major manufac-
turing companies that make complex, high value engineered prod-
ucts. The companies with which we have collaborated are respon-
sible for the design, manufacture and assembly of parts but, given
the nature of their ﬁnal products, are also systems integrators of
parts that are procured from global supply chains. The responsi-
bilities of supply chain management within these organisations in-
clude selecting and developing suppliers, as well as ensuring a suf-
ﬁcient supply of parts to the required speciﬁcation to meet produc-
tion demands. These supply bases are extensive and often there is
a long lead time with initial contracting of new suppliers happen-
ing 3–5 years ahead of the delivery of supplied parts. ∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: j.quigley@strath.ac.uk (J. Quigley), lesley.walls@strath.ac.uk (L. 
Walls), guven.demirel@essex.ac.uk (G. Demirel), bart.maccarthy@nottingham.ac.uk 
(B.L. MacCarthy), mahdi.parsa@agriculture.gov.au (M. Parsa). 
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.044 
0377-2217/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uCompany operations are underpinned by large databases con-
aining information on suppliers (e.g. commodity grouping, tech-
ology maturity, geographical location), items (e.g. unit price, lead
ime, design ownership), and orders (e.g. volumes, delivery status,
uality conformance). Routine management reports include data
nalysis to provide information about supplier performance. Com-
any cultures encourage and embrace rational analysis for opera-
ional decision-making. These include decisions to undertake dif-
erent kinds of activities for poorly performing suppliers and to
lan interactions with some suppliers to avoid future problems.
upplying parts at the required quality level is fundamental to
chieve the desired level of performance. Supplier development
s a costly activity for the companies because it requires deploy-
ent of skilled personnel for substantial periods of time. The de-
loyment of such resources requires consideration of the costs and
ffectiveness of activities. It is within this industrial context that
e seek to help management (1) to assess how much it is worth
pending to improve supplier quality performance and (2) to un-
erstand whether there is value in learning more about supplier
uality capabilities. nder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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d  Krause, Handﬁeld, and Scannell (1998) describe supplier devel-
pment as “any set of activities undertaken by a buying ﬁrm to iden-
ify, measure and improve supplier performance and facilitate the con-
inuous improvement of the overall value of goods and services sup-
lied to the buying company’s business unit”. In considering the two
hallenges posed by our industry problem, we distinguish between
wo types of activity: those that primarily will help us learn more
bout the state of a supplier’s current capabilities, such as plant
isits, auditing ( Handley & Gray, 2013; Mayer, Nickerson, & Owan,
004 ); and those interventions primarily designed to improve sup-
lier quality, such as supplier training, allocating buyer personnel
o improve the supplier’s technical base and operations ( Krause,
andﬁeld, & Scannell, 1998; Krause, Handﬁeld, & Tyler, 2007 ). We
an then conceptualise a modelling approach that incorporates a
wo stage decision process, considering how much should be in-
ested in supplier quality improvement activities and whether it is
aluable to make an investment now or after learning more about
he supplier. These decisions are made under uncertainty about the
rue quality level that a supplier will achieve. The degree of un-
ertainty will be inﬂuenced by how much experience the buying
rm has with a supplier. For established suppliers with whom the
uyer has a long history about quality achieved, the uncertainties
ay be less than for a supplier who is more recently integrated
nto the buying ﬁrm’s supply base. 
To build a meaningful model we need to understand the nature
f uncertainties affecting supplier quality performance. Our general
odel is developed with parameters to reﬂect quality uncertain-
ies. A distinctive feature of our approach is that we distinguish
etween aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, which relate respec-
ively to those uncertainties that are regarded as irreducible and
hose that are reducible if more information is collected ( Hoffman
 Hammonds, 1994 ). Generally, epistemic uncertainty represents
ome degree of ignorance or incomplete information about the sys-
em or aspects of the system of interest, and importantly such un-
ertainty can be reduced as information is collected. In contrast,
leatory uncertainty describes the inherent random variation that
s a property of the system and is therefore not considered re-
ucible ( Bedford & Cooke, 2001 ). In operational quality systems an
mprovement in capability would be realised by a reduction in the
rocess variation resulting from a decision to develop a supplier’s
uality performance ( Kotz & Lovelace, 1998 ). Epistemic uncertainty
n this context is concerned with the a priori state of knowledge
bout a supplier’s process capability and is expressed before mak-
ng the decision to develop a supplier or not. Learning by the buyer
bout a supplier’s true quality capability reduces epistemic uncer-
ainty. 
We develop a stochastic model within a Bayesian framework to
apture both the epistemic uncertainty associated with true sup-
lier quality performance as well as the aleatory uncertainty asso-
iated with the inherent randomness in a supplier’s performance
uch as that observed in quality performance data. Our approach is
rounded in the value of information concept that data has value
f, once analysed, it can result in a change of decision ( Ketzenberg,
osenzweig, Marucheck, & Metters, 2007; Wagner, 1969 ). We con-
ider value to be a combination of the likelihood of changing a
ecision and the magnitude of its consequence. By formulating an
ppropriate stochastic model we can estimate the uncertainty as-
ociated with the decision consequences, assign likelihoods to pos-
ible data and update the stochastic model in view of data. 
We consider a context where we have a dominant prime en-
ity (the buyer), such as one of the major manufacturers with
hich we work, that relies on an extensive base of suppliers. We
herefore assume a single buying organisation with multiple sup-
liers that have been selected according to the buyer’s standard
rocurement process. Thus, for a new supplier there is insight
nto anticipated quality performance based on evidence from, forxample, quality process reviews, quality certiﬁcation, quality
chieved for similar parts, or ﬁrst article inspections. For those
uppliers that have supplied parts to the buyer, data will also ex-
st on quality performance achieved historically. Our model is in-
ended to be most useful for those suppliers whose relationship
ith the buyer is relatively new and for whom a proactive ap-
roach to development will be taken, for example, during the pe-
iod between signing a contract and delivery of the regular supply
f orders. This is because in such cases epistemic uncertainty is
ikely to be greater than for suppliers with whom the relationship
s more mature. 
We do not consider the choice of activity beyond the two
lasses of development noted above; learning and improvement.
ur model requires as inputs an expression of the buyer’s assess-
ent of epistemic uncertainty in the true supplier quality, as well
s the ﬁnancial value of production losses that will be incurred by
he buyer if sub-standard parts are supplied, and an assessment
f the effectiveness of development activity. The model provides
he level of the optimal investment in a supplier improvement ac-
ivity with an upper bound on the amount it is worth spending
o reduce the epistemic uncertainty about the supplier quality by
argeting learning activities before investing in improvement. Such
esults help the manager to screen suppliers to assess whether it
s worth conducting additional plant visits, audits or other learning
ctivities ﬁrst, or whether it is more appropriate to invest directly
n, for example, training, deployment of buyer resources into the
upplier, root cause analysis or other activities aimed at directly
aking quality improvements. 
In this study we address the challenge posed by a practi-
al industry problem by developing and evaluating an innova-
ive and applicable modelling solution using a sound mathemat-
cal methodology. Our principal contribution is a new modelling
ramework for supplier development taking into account the value
f information. The model is grounded in the theory of decision
nalysis and statistical inference, and is aligned with an important
ndustrial supply management problem for which we develop a
ethodology to support implementation with real data. Our model
ddresses gaps in the existing literature in relation to research on
upplier development and the value of information within a supply
hain quality management context. The existing literature tends
argely either to develop mathematical models for assumed scenar-
os providing insightful thinking tools, or to discuss the theory and
ractice of supplier development in an operational supply manage-
ent context. 
We examine the literature relevant to our problem context and
osition our work in relation to existing empirical knowledge and
odels on supplier development in Section 2 . Our scientiﬁc mod-
lling contribution is described in Section 3 . We explain how we
ormulate the stochastic model based on assumptions about the
robabilistic representation of uncertainties and present a number
f propositions related to properties of the model. We develop an
xact solution for the expected value under perfect information,
hich is the limiting case of buying down epistemic uncertainty
hrough learning activities. To support practical implementation,
e derive a computational approximation and evaluate the condi-
ions under which it is accurate. Section 4 presents an application
f our model to real, albeit de-sensitised, industry data on supplier
on-conformance rates for a set of key tier 1 suppliers to a large
ndustrial prime. We present an empirical Bayes method to esti-
ate the prior distribution representing the epistemic uncertainty
n supplier performance using typical data contained in industry
atabases. After discussing the reasonableness of our assumptions
iven the industry problem and data, we present a selection of
ays in which the ﬁndings of our model can be communicated
o supply chain managers. Section 5 presents our conclusions and
iscusses the implications of our ﬁndings for practice and theory,
934 J. Quigley et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 264 (2018) 932–947 
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e  including identifying future challenges and opportunities for fur-
ther work. 
2. Positioning within scientiﬁc literature 
Our research relates to several strands of the supply chain man-
agement and decision sciences literatures. We brieﬂy review semi-
nal studies on supplier development in order to position our mod-
elling approach appropriately within this context. We critically re-
view those studies that focus on modelling the value of informa-
tion in supply chains with a particular emphasis on the treatment
of uncertainties. 
2.1. Supplier development 
Krause, Handﬁeld, and Scannell (1998) , Che and Hausch (1999) ,
and Krause, Handﬁeld, and Tyler (2007) provide detailed accounts
of supplier development approaches in practice. In particular,
Krause, Handﬁeld, and Scannell (1998) present a general represen-
tation of a supplier development process grounded in an extensive
industry survey. From our contemporary company engagement, the
identiﬁed process still typiﬁes many aspects of current practice. For
example, critical commodities and suppliers are identiﬁed, key per-
formance areas are targeted, appropriate teams are formed, and ac-
tivities are selected, implemented and reviewed. Interestingly, one
step in the general process notes that “opportunities and probability
for improvement” through supplier development should be identi-
ﬁed. However, no further consideration is given as to how such
probabilities should be expressed, although criteria such as the po-
tential to inﬂuence the supplier development process, resources re-
quired in terms of people and time, as well as the potential re-
turn on investment are discussed. Krause, Handﬁeld, and Scannell
(1998) pose the question “what criteria should be used to identify
suppliers that have high probability of development success?”. Our
model helps to answer this question by estimating the value of
gaining more information about supplier quality and providing a
probabilistic assessment of the risks of such investments, given the
degree of epistemic uncertainty, as well as the buyer’s assessment
of the potential to develop the supplier. 
Krause, Handﬁeld, and Scannell (1998) classify supplier devel-
opment activities into reactive and strategic approaches. Reactive
approaches are the ﬁrst stage in the development process where
investment is made into poorly performing suppliers to undertake
corrective actions. Strategic supplier development, on the other
hand, is applied at a more advanced stage where the buyer devel-
ops a strategic plan for the supply base to increase the long-term
capability of the supply network. We position our approach in be-
tween these extremes, essentially as a tuned proactive approach,
which estimates the value of collecting further information on sup-
plier capability in order to mitigate the risk of poor quality and
avoid extensive exposure to risks of a supplier failing to perform. 
Supply chain managers are interested in multiple performance
measures; Ward, McCreery, Ritzman, and Sharma (1998) high-
light four priorities — quality, delivery, ﬂexibility and cost. Krause,
Handﬁeld, and Tyler (2007) note that quality has been recognised
as important in manufacturing since the 1980s and continues to be
of considerable concern since end customer perceptions of the ﬁnal
product quality will be impacted by the quality of parts manufac-
tured by suppliers. They ﬁnd that performance outcomes in qual-
ity, as well as delivery and ﬂexibility, are affected by direct involve-
ment of the buyer’s personnel in supplier development. Hence,
deciding how much to invest in interventions aimed at improv-
ing supplier quality remains an important business challenge more
generally beyond our motivating industrial problem. 
Supplier development has been previously investigated in sev-
eral modelling studies. Based on the primary methodology used,e classify the literature into (1) game theoretical studies and (2)
tochastic modelling approaches. 
Most game theoretical studies focus on strategic supplier de-
elopment for production cost reduction ( Bernstein & Kok, 2009;
ida, 2007; Iyer, Schwarz, & Zenios, 2005; Kim & Netessine, 2013;
i, Hyun-Soo, & Amitabh, 2015 ). For instance, Bernstein and Kok
2009) consider cost reduction investments of suppliers in an as-
embly network where the effectiveness of cost-contingent and
arget-price contracts in promoting investments and increasing
roﬁts is analysed. Similarly, Iida (2007) considers an assembly
etwork where both the buyer and the suppliers might invest in
ost reduction, showing that effort compensation and cost sharing
greements can enable supply chain coordination. Although cost
eduction effort may be interpreted as a means to satisfy certain
uality requirements, quality is not given explicit consideration in
hese studies. More related to our approach is the study by Zhu,
hang, and Tsung (2007) that explicitly investigates the improve-
ent of a supplier’s quality where both the buyer and the sup-
lier can invest to decrease the non-conformance rate, showing
hat investment by only the party with higher investment effec-
iveness is suﬃcient unless there are resource constraints. Our re-
earch differs from these game theoretical studies in two ways.
irst, we consider the problem from the buyer’s perspective be-
ause we adopt a client decision support focus. Second, our ap-
roach is based on real-world data, both empirical and judgemen-
al. In contrast, game-theoretical studies in the literature are more
eneral and make idealistic assumptions in particular regarding
ncertainty, as we explore further below. 
Stochastic programming has been used to study supplier de-
elopment in a more limited number of studies ( Friedl & Wag-
er, 2012; Wang, Gilland, & Tomlin, 2010 ). For instance, Wang,
illand, and Tomlin (2010) use a two-stage stochastic program-
ing framework where in the ﬁrst stage the buyer selects the in-
estment levels, and based on their returns, which are subject to
ariation, the order quantities are selected. Of more interest to our
roblem, Talluri, Narasimhan, and Chung (2010) and Hosseininasab
nd Ahmadi (2015) study strategic supplier development using
arkowitz-type mean-variance risk models to formulate the op-
imal levels of investment in a set of suppliers. Hosseininasab and
hmadi (2015) note the importance of taking into account future
erformance and anticipated changes in the development of sup-
liers. They also discuss the use of databases to identify trends and
orrelations in supplier performance although they use only syn-
hetically generated data for supplier quality, delivery, price and
nancial position. Our approach differs from these studies in sev-
ral ways. First, we consider only quality, unlike authors who fo-
us on multiple performance measures, see, for example, the re-
iew by Ho, Xu, and Dey (2010) . Second, our model provides the
xpected return on investment in quality improvement as an out-
ut, rather than using it as a model input. Third, as mentioned
or game-theoretic models, we use real data rather than synthet-
cally generated data. Fourth, we consider a stochastic modelling
ramework to account for the potential reduction of epistemic un-
ertainty, which is not captured in Markowitz-type models. 
.2. Value of information 
The established concept of value of information (VOI) in
ecision analysis is predicated on the ability of additional infor-
ation to reduce epistemic uncertainty. Since Wagner (1969) ,
uch has been written about VOI. In the context of inventory
anagement in particular, the value of sharing information about
ustomer demand, forecasts, inventory level, and production ca-
acity for supply chain coordination, cost reduction, and bullwhip
ffect mitigation has been widely investigated; see reviews by
J. Quigley et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 264 (2018) 932–947 935 
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i  ahin and Robinson (2002) and Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig,
arucheck, and Metters (2007) . 
In their survey article on inventory management, Ketzenberg,
osenzweig, Marucheck, and Metters (2007) describe VOI as the
arginal improvement in value through additional use of infor-
ation relative to some base scenario, where the base scenario
epresents a given set of information that can be compared to
he value gained from the so-called information scenario, which
s structurally identical to the base scenario except that additional
nformation is shared. The authors argue there is growing inter-
st in VOI because of the increasing opportunities to gain more
nformation due to the growth in e-commerce. They discuss differ-
nt sources of uncertainty, distinguished as random and system-
tic, which relate to the stochastic and structural characteristics
f the system and so could be considered equivalent to aleatory
nd epistemic uncertainties, respectively. More generally, much has
een written about uncertainty in supply chain management with
ifferent classiﬁcations being proposed; see, for example, the re-
iew by Simangunsong, Hendry, and Stevenson (2012) . 
Interestingly, Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig, Marucheck, and Metters 
2007) also formulate several propositions about VOI in an inven-
ory management context. Of most relevance to us are the fol-
owing, which we paraphrase as follows: (1) VOI is higher when
here is greater uncertainty and (2) VOI is higher when there is in-
reased responsiveness. Based on a regression analysis of the em-
irical data extracted from their literature review, strong support is
ound for the second and partial support for the ﬁrst proposition.
n our concluding discussions, we reﬂect upon these propositions
ith regard to our modelling theory and application in a quality
anagement context. 
The supply chain quality management literature contains arti-
les that focus upon decision models related to supplier quality
nd include the treatment of uncertainty. In the agency settings
f such studies, one or both parties involved in a buyer-supplier
elation might beneﬁt from hiding private information, leading to
oral hazard and adverse selection problems. In such settings the
ther party needs to provide incentives to establish coordination
r incur an information ‘rent’ to reveal the hidden information.
s discussed above in the context of supplier development, Zhu,
hang, and Tsung (2007) build a model to determine which invest-
ent options in quality improvement are optimal for both parties
hen buyer production is outsourced to a supplier. Aleatory uncer-
ainty in the supplier quality control process is modelled in terms
f the non-conformance rate and the quality costs incurred by both
he supplier and the buyer are explicated. Although the relative
tates of knowledge of the buyer and supplier are acknowledged,
o consideration is given to the articulation of such epistemic un-
ertainty as a probability distribution. 
In contrast, Lim (2001) and Corbett, Zhou, and Tang (2004) dis-
uss the explicit mathematical representation of uncertainties as
rior probabilities in the context of buyer-supplier contracting de-
isions. Neither study uses the term epistemic uncertainty, but
he concept is clear from the explicit consideration given to ex-
nte views of buyers and the use of prior probability distributions
ithin the models. Lim (2001) develops a buyer decision model
or contract option selections when there is uncertainty in supplier
uality; expressing a prior probability on the supplier’s technology
ype to provide a probabilistic assessment of the fraction of de-
ective parts anticipated to be supplied to the buyer. The increas-
ng role of e-commerce data as a motivation for such modelling is
dentiﬁed, with the authors commenting that the visibility of part
uality data afforded by shared database systems can impact the
egree of information asymmetry between the buyer and the sup-
lier. This observation is contextually important for our problem. 
Corbett, Zhou, and Tang (2004) assume a bilateral buyer-
upplier monopoly within which they examine scenarios to assessOI of multiple contract types. They assume the supplier holds a
rior distribution that expresses her uncertainty about the buyer’s
nternal variable costs. The decision model is developed for a gen-
ral prior distribution represented by a continuous probability dis-
ribution function, although numerical experiments examine vari-
us distributional forms of the assumed prior as a form of sensi-
ivity analysis. Different parameter value sets are selected to inves-
igate the effects of controlling the degree of change in the prior
ean and variance. Thus, they are, in effect, exploring the effects
f different degrees of epistemic uncertainty on their decisions.
e adopt an equivalent approach, although we explore sensitivity
o changes in the degree of epistemic uncertainty expressed using
eal data. 
While different ways of mathematically representing prior
robabilities have been articulated by Lim (2001) and especially
y Corbett, Zhou, and Tang (2004) , there has been no considera-
ion of how such distributions might be speciﬁed in an industrial
ecision-making context. We show how typically available industry
ata can be used to form meaningful, rather than assumed, prior
istributions to represent epistemic uncertainty. 
. A modelling framework for valuing supplier development 
Our modelling concept is illustrated using a decision tree
hown in Fig. 1 . The buyer needs to choose whether or not to in-
est in activities to improve supplier quality (upper two branches)
r whether to gather more information to learn about supplier
uality capability before investing in improvement activities (lower
ranch). The decision tree is a visual simpliﬁcation with a binary
good or poor) representation of supplier quality. Our full model
onsiders the occurrence of poor quality events that risk delaying
r disrupting supply to the buyer as measured by the number of
on-conformances within some period of buyer exposure to risk.
he exposure to risk could be measured by, for example, the calen-
ar time or the number of parts ordered from the supplier. We at-
ach a probability distribution to the uncertainties associated with
upplier quality. Not shown in the diagram are the buyer valua-
ions associated with each decision pathway, which we measure as
he buyer’s loss due to poor supplier quality. The model allows us
o determine the highest amount the buyer be prepared to spend
n the time window between contracting the new supplier and de-
ivery of orders to learn more about a supplier to reduce epistemic
ncertainty about the true quality performance. Hence it supports
he manager in assessing whether it is worth learning more be-
ore making choices about improvement activities, or whether it is
etter to make improvement decisions in light of the current state
f knowledge. If the latter option is deemed more worthy, then
he model further allows the manager to decide whether to invest,
r not, in improvement activities and also how much it is worth
pending to improve supplier quality should this option be chosen.
.1. Modelling assumptions about the stochastic nature of uncertainty
Let N denote the random variable, number of non-
onformances, and let t denote the exposure to risk of non-
onformances to the buyer. We assume that the mean number
f non-conformances is proportional to the exposure to risk. We
odel N as a Poisson random variable with parameter , which
enotes the non-conformance rate in proportion to exposure.
xposure may be measured on a continuous (e.g. time) or discrete
e.g. order size) scale. When exposure is measured by a continuous
etric then a Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) is rather than
s a special case of our model. The Poisson model is the simplest
odel for the number of non-conformances that is both popular in
he literature ( Montgomery, 2013 ) and is reasonable for our empir-
cal data, as we shall show in Section 4 . The aleatory uncertainty
936 J. Quigley et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 264 (2018) 932–947 
Fig. 1. Model concept as a simpliﬁed decision tree of buyer decisions ( ) and supplier quality uncertainties ( ) . 
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irepresenting the natural variation in the non-conformance rate is
modelled by the Poisson probability distribution conditioned on
knowing  = λ as in Eq. (3.1) . 
P ( N = n |  = λ) = ( λt ) 
n 
e −λt 
n ! 
, t > 0 , λ > 0 , n = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . (3.1)
Practically, we shall not precisely know a supplier’s true non-
conformance rate, and so we describe our epistemic uncertainty
on the value of this parameter, λ, through a prior probability dis-
tribution, denoted by π ( λ). We assume π ( λ) can be described by
a Gamma distribution as shown in Eq. (3.2) . The Gamma distribu-
tion is a conjugate prior to the Poisson model and hence is math-
ematically tractable giving it popularity as the Poisson–Gamma
model ( Carlin & Louis, 2009 ). More importantly, the Gamma dis-
tribution with shape and scale parameters, α and β , respectively,
provides a ﬂexible family of distributional shapes through which
epistemic uncertainty can be expressed probabilistically. 
π( λ) = β
αλα−1 e −βλ
( α) 
, α > 0 , β > 0 , λ > 0 . (3.2)
If new data becomes available in the form of n 0 observed non-
conformance events for a risk exposure of t 0 then, using Bayes The-
orem, we can update the prior in Eq. (3.2) with the new data to
obtain the posterior distribution. This will also be in the form of a
Gamma distribution with a change in parameters as shown in Eq.
(3.3) . 
π( λ| n 0 , t 0 ) = ( β + t 0 ) 
αλα+ n 0 −1 e −( β+ t 0 ) λ
( α + n 0 ) 
, 
α > 0 , β > 0 , λ > 0 , t 0 > 0 , n 0 = 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . (3.3)
The prior in Eq. (3.2) represents our epistemic uncertainty
about the true supplier quality given our knowledge of that sup-
plier to date. Our future experience with the supplier will result
in a new prior, which is effectively the posterior distribution ex-
pressed in Eq. (3.3) . Intuitively, as we gain more knowledge ofhe supplier, our epistemic uncertainty should reduce. Asymptot-
cally as t 0 approaches ∞ , our epistemic uncertainty approaches
ero, because we shall have learnt everything about the true non-
onformance rate and so we are left only with the natural random
ariation described in Eq. (3.1) . 
.2. Speciﬁcation of a prior distribution 
As noted above, the prior distribution represents the buyer’s
pistemic uncertainty about the true non-conformance rate of an
ndividual supplier of interest. If several suppliers are candidates
or development by the buyer, then each supplier will be modelled
ndividually. Although we assume the prior comes from a common
amily of Gamma distributions, the buyer’s epistemic uncertainty
bout each individual supplier is represented by specifying appro-
riate parameter values for that supplier. 
Alternative modelling tactics can be adopted to specify a prior
istribution for a supplier. A prior can be constructed empiri-
ally. For example, Quigley and Walls (2017) describe a general
tructured process for eliciting the domain knowledge of an ex-
ert, such as a supply chain manager, to deﬁne reference factors
pon which relevant empirical data from existing suppliers can be
atched to the supplier of interest and subsequently veriﬁed as
n expression of the epistemic uncertainty in that supplier’s true
on-conformance rate. In this situation, the parameters of the
amma prior distribution require to be estimated statistically.
e show how this is accomplished using standard approaches in
he context of our industry example. Alternatively, the subjective
udgement of the buyer can be elicited using a structured expert
udgement process to express the buyer’s epistemic uncertainty
n the supplier true non-conformance rate ( O’Hagan et al., 2006;
uigley, Bedford, & Walls, 2008 ). A subjective prior distribution is
ppropriate if the expert believes s/he has more information than
s contained in the relevant empirical data. 
J. Quigley et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 264 (2018) 932–947 937 
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Table 1 
Interpretation of elasticity ( 	) in terms of effectiveness 
rate ( γ ) and optimal investment ( x ∗). 
Elasticity Impact of percentage increase in γ
	 ≤ −1 Decrease in x ∗ of at least a percent 
−1 < 	 < 0 Decrease in x ∗ less than a percent 
	 = 0 No change in x ∗
0 < 	 < 1 Increase in x ∗ less than a percent 
	 = 1 Increase in x ∗ of a percent 
	 > 1 Increase in x ∗ of greater than a percent 
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p  In the subsequent steps of our modelling framework, a prior
istribution is treated in the same way regardless of whether it
as been constructed empirically or subjectively. 
.3. Optimal investment in supplier quality improvement activity 
Let x denote the level of investment in supplier quality im-
rovement, where the anticipated beneﬁt is better capability and
educed non-conformance. Let v denote the loss incurred by the
uyer from a single non-conformance, i.e. the unit cost of internal
uality failure to the buyer. Here, we consider v to be an exogenous
arameter that needs to be estimated by the buyer. Porter and
ayner (1992) and Schiffauerova and Thomson (2006) provide gen-
ral reviews on the costs of quality. Following Nandakumar, Datar,
nd Akella (1993) , in quantifying v consideration should be given
o penalties for production delays due to unavailable or unsuitable
arts, inventory holding costs for other parts used in lieu of non-
onforming parts, costs for rescheduling and switch-over to other
rders, and demand side costs of loss of goodwill, such as customer
efection and loss of potential future customers, due to the delays,
nd so on. 
To associate the supplier investment level with the supplier
erformance, we deﬁne γ as a measure of the effectiveness rate of
he improvement activity, where higher effectiveness is reﬂected
n larger values of γ . We consider a diminishing marginal return
f investment in the reduction of non-conformances. We employ
he mathematical formulation used by Porteus (1986) and Zhu,
hang, and Tsung (2007) , where the non-conformance rate reduces
t a fraction that decreases exponentially with increasing level of
nvestment. Namely, if the number of non-conformances is N in
he absence of a development investment, it is expected to de-
rease to Ne −γ x when x monetary units are invested and the ef-
ectiveness rate is γ . The effectiveness of a development activity
ill depend upon, for example, the type and nature of improve-
ent considered, the familiarity of the buyer with the range of
arts supplied and production technologies used, and the nature
f the relationship between the buyer and the supplier in ad-
ition to the commitment of the particular supplier; these need
o be reﬂected in the value chosen for the parameter γ . In this
aper we focus upon modelling the epistemic uncertainty in the
on-conformance rate because we wish to apply our model us-
ng operational data available to the buyer. The effectiveness rate
arameter is represented as a single value, although as we show
n our industry example, the sensitivity of results to changes in
he speciﬁed rate of effectiveness can be examined. Future exten-
ions of our univariate stochastic model could accommodate mod-
lling of epistemic uncertainties on multiple parameters at the
ost of increased model complexity, computational and elicitation
urdens. 
Let P denote the proﬁt function expressed as the difference be-
ween the value associated with a reduction in the number of non-
onformances through the improvement activity, and the invest-
ent level, x , required to undertake the supplier quality improve-
ent, as shown in Eq. (3.4) . The initial term represents the reduc-
ion in buyer loss due to non-conformances before ( v N) and after
 v Ne −γ x ) quality improvement. 
 = v N 
(
1 − e −γ x 
)
− x. (3.4)
o obtain the optimal level of investment, we evaluate the ex-
ected proﬁt when epistemic uncertainty is represented by the
amma prior distribution in Eq. (3.2) . That is, we are consider-
ng the prior information scenario associated with the top two
ranches of Fig. 1 . The expected proﬁt function derived is given
n Eq. (3.5) . 
 [ P ] = v α
β
t 
(
1 − e −γ x 
)
− x. (3.5)he product of parameters v t in the expected proﬁt given in Eq.
3.5) measures the exposure of the buyer to the beneﬁt of the in-
estment. Consistent with the formulation of the Poisson model, t
ould be measured by, for example, the number of parts ordered
rom the supplier or the duration of projects for which it is antic-
pated that the supplier will work with the buyer, and the cost to
he buyer of each non-conforming part is v . This parametric formu-
ation can also accommodate a Net Present Value (NPV) weighting
f future beneﬁts as we show in Appendix A . The optimal invest-
ent level, x ∗, of the expected proﬁt function is given in Eq. (3.6) .
 
∗ = max 
( 
0 , 
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
)
γ
) 
. (3.6) 
rom Eq. (3.6) we can make several observations. First, suﬃciently
ow levels of effectiveness will result in zero investment in supplier
mprovement activity (middle branch of Fig. 1 ). Second, and less
bvious, the optimal investment level does not have a monotonic
elationship with the effectiveness rate. This leads us to formulate
roposition 1 . The proof is given in Appendix B . 
roposition 1. The elasticity, denoted by 	, of optimal investment
x ∗) with respect to the effectiveness rate ( γ )—the ratio of the per-
entage change in x ∗ with respect to the percentage change in γ—can
e expressed as: 
 = 1 
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
) − 1 . 
mplying that if: 
n ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
)
> 1 , 
hen an increase in the effectiveness rate will result in a decrease in
ptimal investment. 
Table 1 summarises the interpretation of elasticity. Expressions
or the expected proﬁt at x ∗ can be obtained through substitution
f Eq. (3.6) into Eq. (3.5) to obtain Eq. (3.7) . Note that Eq. (3.7) pro-
ides an expectation, whereas the actual future outcome will vary
s illustrated in Fig. 1 . 
 [ P ; x ∗] = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎩ 
v tγ α
β
− 1 − ln 
(
v tγ α
β
)
γ
if v tγ
α
β
> 1 
0 if v tγ
α
β
≤ 1 
(3.7) 
.4. Assessing worth of learning before investing based on expected 
alue of perfect information 
To provide the buyer with a useful means of assessing whether
here is value in activities to learn more about supplier quality we
ompute the expected proﬁt under an assumption of perfect infor-
ation. Expected value under perfect information (EVPI) does not
ndicate how much should be invested in a particular quality im-
rovement investment, which was described in Section 3.3 . Rather,
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βestimating EVPI guides managers on how much it is worth spend-
ing to buy down epistemic uncertainty about the supplier’s true
non-conformance rate before investing in an improvement activity.
Speciﬁcally, computing the expected value of information as the
difference between the EVPI and the expected proﬁt without per-
fect information provides an assessment of how much it is worth
spending, at most, to remove all epistemic uncertainty, and hence
provides an upper bound on the amount it would cost to reduce
uncertainty if information gained was partial and imperfect. This
captures the lower branch of Fig. 1 . 
For the supplier’s true non-conformance rate, , we can deter-
mine the optimal investment decision under perfect information,
which we denote by X PI as it is a function of the random variable
. Eq. (3.8) provides an expression for the expected value of proﬁt
under perfect information given our modelling assumptions stated
in Section 3.1 . 
E [ P | x ∗ = X PI ] = 
{
v t γ−1 −ln ( v t γ) 
γ if v tγ > 1 
0 if v tγ ≤ 1 (3.8)
Since the true supplier non-conformance rate is not known we
take the expectation of Eq. (3.8) with respect to  using the prior
distribution given in Eq. (3.2) . Proposition 2 gives an analytic ex-
pression for the EVPI. The proof is shown in Appendix B . 
Proposition 2. For the Poisson probability distribution given in Eq.
(3.1) with a Gamma prior distribution for true non-conformance rate
given in Eq. (3.2) and the objective function of form shown in Eq.
(3.5) , then the Expected Value under Perfect Information (EVPI) can
be expressed as shown in Eq. (3.9) . 
EVPI = 
v tγ α
β
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + 1 , βv tγ
))
− 1 + F 
(
1 ;α, βv tγ
)
γ
+ 
∞ ∑ 
i =1 
i ∑ 
j=0 
( i −1 ) ! 
( i − j ) ! j! ( −1 ) j 
( v tγ
β
) j ( α+ j ) 
( α) 
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + j, βv tγ
))
γ
(3.9)
where F 
(
1 ;α + j, βv tγ
)
is the cumulative distribution function of a
Gamma distribution evaluated at 1 with shape parameter (α + j) and
scale parameter βv tγ given by 
F 
(
1 ;α + j, β
v tγ
)
= 
( βv tγ ) 
α+ j e 
β
v tγ
(α + j) 
∞ ∑ 
k =0 
( βv tγ ) 
k ∏ k 
k 1 =0 (α + j + k 1 ) 
. 
Computing the expected value of perfect information (i.e.
EVPI − E [ P ; x ∗] ) allows us to obtain an upper bound on how much
it is worth spending to learn more about a supplier before in-
vesting in quality improvement. If this difference is less than
the expected cost of obtaining the supplier information, then Eq.
(3.6) can be used to support the buyer decision to invest, or
not, in supplier improvement (ﬁrst or second branch from top in
Fig. 1 ). Otherwise, the buyer obtains more information ﬁrst to buy
down epistemic uncertainty by learning more about supplier qual-
ity (lowest branch in Fig. 1 ). 
3.5. Sensitivity of optimal investment to prior variance 
It is interesting to explore how the optimal investment in sup-
plier quality improvement under perfect information, X PI , responds
to changes in the degree of epistemic uncertainty. We use the
prior standard deviation as a summary measure of epistemic un-
certainty. Note also that re-expressing the parameters of the prior
distribution in terms of the mean and standard deviation can be
useful when communicating results to managers since they are
more understandable. 
αTheorem 1 below shows that for situations where the true
on-conformance rate is above the investment threshold, that is
> 1 υtγ , the mean optimal level of investment under perfect in-
ormation is a monotonically decreasing function of the epistemic
ncertainty associated with the non-conformance rate. The proof
s shown in Appendix C . We note that the proof does not require
he prior to have the form of a Gamma distribution. 
heorem 1. If the non-conformance rate is greater than the min-
mum investment threshold, i.e.  > 1 υtγ , then for a ﬁxed mean
on-conformance rate μ
> 1 υtγ
= E 
[

∣∣ > 1 υtγ ], the expected opti-
al investment under perfect information is monotonically decreas-
ng with respect to non-conformance uncertainty, i.e. σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
=
 ar 
[

∣∣ > 1 υtγ ]. Speciﬁcally, ∂E 
[ 
X PI 
∣∣∣> 1 υtγ ] 
∂σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
< 0 . 
.6. Approximation for EVPI and computational accuracy 
Proposition 2 provides an expression for EVPI in terms of a
umulative Gamma distribution function. However, calculating the
VPI using Eq. (3.9) requires a degree of programming knowl-
dge, which might hinder the practical use of the method. Hence
roposition 3 below gives an upper bound approximation for the
VPI to facilitate easier application in, for example, spreadsheets.
e can also obtain a bound on the error between the true EVPI
nd its upper bound, as shown in Proposition 4 , and thus obtain a
ower bound on the EVPI. Proofs to both propositions are shown in
ppendix B . 
roposition 3. The following expression provides an upper bound
UB) for the EVPI expressed in Eq. (3.9) : 
VPI ≤ v t α
β
−
( α) − ln 
(
β
v tγ
)
γ
−
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, β
v tγ
))
(3.10)
here  is the digamma function. 
roposition 4. The error between the upper bound on the EVPI (UB)
Eq. (3.10) ) and the actual EVPI (Eq. (3.9) ) can be bounded as fol-
ows: 
v t 
α
β
−
( α) − ln 
(
β
v tγ
)
γ
−
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, β
v tγ
))
− EV PI 
≤
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e − βv tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e − βv tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e − βv tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) . 
(3.11)
We can characterise the parameter regions where the UB is a
ood approximation for the EVPI. That is, where the right-hand-
ide of Eq. (3.11) is suﬃciently small. Note that the bound in Eq.
3.11) is not a monotonic function of α. Corollary 1 establishes the
imits of this bound for either α or β when the other is held ﬁxed,
howing that the EVPI converges to the UB in these limits for large
or small β . 
orollary 1. For the limits of the error in the upper bound with re-
pect to α and β , the shape and scale parameters of the Gamma prior
istribution respectively, are zero for large α and small β . i.e.: 
lim 
→ 0 
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e − βv tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e − βv tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e − βv tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) = 0 
lim →∞ 
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e − βv tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e − βv tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e − βv tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) = 0 
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Fig. 2. Process showing relation between inputs and outputs when modelling a new supplier. Dotted lines show an alternative path when modelling an existing supplier. 
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p  The accuracy of the UB as an approximation for the actual EVPI
s assessed in Appendix C for a range of parameter values for α and
. Our results show that the accuracy of the UB increases as the
hape parameter α increases, which is consistent with Corollary 1 .
n addition, its accuracy also increases for increasing values
f the effectiveness rate γ and decreasing values of the scale
arameter β . 
. Industry example 
Fig. 2 summarises our general modelling framework and we
ow discuss its application to a real industry problem for a large
anufacturing company making highly engineered heavy machin-
ry. The company has an extensive in-bound supply base. Lead
imes can be long for new projects since initial contracting de-
isions with critical suppliers can be made several years ahead.
uring the time period before parts arrive, the company faces
he ‘buyer’s dilemma’ addressed by our modelling framework.
he core decision problems are whether or not to invest in ac-
ivities to improve quality or whether to invest in activities to
earn more about a supplier’s quality. This dilemma is particu-
arly acute for suppliers that are newly integrated into the buying
ompany’s supply base and for whom there may be little empiri-
al evidence about the required part quality since initial contract-
ng and procurement information is limited to checks on certiﬁca-
ion, quality processes, and previous quality outcomes for related
roducts. 
.1. Setting model parameters 
A modelling choice needs to be made about the approach
dopted to specify the prior distribution expressing the buyer’s
ncertainty of the new supplier’s true non-conformance rate. In
his study, the manager is able to construct a suitable compara-
or pool of existing suppliers based on reference factors elicitedollowing the methodology of Quigley and Walls (2017) . Moreover,
he records taken from the company ERP system provide relevant
on-conformance data for the suppliers in the comparator pool.
herefore, we elect to construct an empirical prior distribution in
his case. The steps in estimating the empirical prior distribution
re described in Section 4.2 . 
The model also requires as inputs an assessment of the effec-
iveness of the improvement activity and an estimate of the loss
ncurred by the manufacturer if non-conforming parts are sup-
lied. In this study, we investigate the impact of setting differ-
nt effectiveness rates on decision-making to cover a range of de-
rees of effectiveness for different types of improvement activi-
ies, the buyer’s familiarity with the supplier, the parts and tech-
ologies used, and different levels of supplier engagement. For the
urposes of this example, we set the buyer loss to be one unit
er non-conformance occurrence, i.e. v = 1 , to de-sensitise the cost
aluations. 
.2. Estimating an empirical prior distribution 
We use empirical data from company databases on the annual
requencies of non-conforming parts recorded over several years
or a comparator pool of 35 suppliers. To estimate the parame-
ers of the prior distribution using the selected data we adopt a
ethod, known as empirical Bayes, which has been used in a sim-
lar manner in technical risk analysis ( Quigley, Bedford, & Walls,
007; Quigley, Hardman, Bedford, & Walls, 2011 ) and also more
enerally ( Carlin & Louis, 2009 ). 
In order to obtain the Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE)
f the prior distribution’s parameters, we require an expression
or the predictive distribution that explains the relationship be-
ween the observed data and the prior parameters ( Good, 1976 ).
q. (4.1) shows the predictive distribution as a Negative Binomial
istribution, where N i denotes the number of non-conforming
arts for supplier i and t represents the exposure to risk for sup-i 
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Fig. 3. (a) Joint 95% conﬁdence region for the empirical prior mean and standard deviation of the true number of non-conforming parts per annum. (b) P–P plot of the 
predictive distribution against the empirical distribution. 
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w  plier i , which in this example is 1 year. We justify this choice
of exposure because we want to relate the supply risk to the
buyer’s manufacturing projects and so consider the implications
when parts may not be available for assembly of the engineering
product. The remaining notation is the same as in Section 3 . 
P ( N i = n i ) = 
∞ ∫ 
0 
( λi t i ) 
n i e −λi k i 
n i ! 
βαλi 
α−1 
e −βλi 
( α) 
dλ
= ( n i + α) 
( α) n i ! 
(
β
β + t i 
)α(
t i 
β + t i 
)n i 
, 
α > 0 , β > 0 , n i = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . (4.1)
Using the predictive distribution we construct the log-likelihood
function for the data across the pool of 35 suppliers as follows: 
l ( α, β) ∝ 
35 ∑ 
i =1 
[
d i + α ln 
(
β
β + t i 
)
+ n i 
(
t i 
β + t i 
)]
where d i = 
⎧ ⎨ 
⎩ 
n i −1 ∑ 
j=0 
ln ( j + α) , if n i ≥ 1 
0 if n i = 0 . 
We obtain the MLE of the parameters of the empirical prior to
be ˆ α = 0 . 0879 and ˆ β = 0 . 0018 . Construction of joint conﬁdence re-
gions for the prior parameters are obtained using likelihood theory
( Lawless, 2003 ). Here, we re-parameterise the prior parameters to
express them in terms of the pool mean non-conformance rate ( μ)
and standard deviation ( σ ), which we ﬁnd are more directly under-
standable in reasoning about the meaning of the empirical prior
distribution with supply chain managers. Fig. 3 (a) illustrates the
95% joint conﬁdence region showing strong association between
the prior mean and standard deviation, which are 48.83 and 164.71
for this data set, respectively. The mean number of non-conforming
parts per annum in the pool is not likely to exceed 400 and the
standard deviation in the non-conformance frequency is not likely
to be greater than 1400. 
Now that we have estimated the prior distribution, we can as-
sess the validity of our modelling assumptions. Fig. 3 (b) shows a
P–P plot to assess the ﬁt of the estimated predictive distribution
model to the empirical data. There is a good ﬁt in both extremes
of the distribution, although there are values below the 45 degree
reference line in the centre indicating that the model is more con-ervative than the data in this region. However the ﬁt is good in
he upper right hand tail, which is important in our risk analysis
ince this is the high consequence situation where the true sup-
lier non-conformance rate may be relatively high. 
We now use the empirical prior distribution as a probability
odel representing the epistemic uncertainty in the true non-
onformance rate of the new supplier of interest. This Gamma
rior probability distribution function is shown in Fig. 4 (a) and
ndicates a high probability the true non-conformance rate will
e low, but the right tail in the distribution implies there re-
ains a relatively lower chance the true non-conformance rate of
he new supplier will be high. Using the MLE, ˆ α = 0 . 0879 and
ˆ = 0 . 0018 , we can update the uncertainty associated with the
rue non-conformance rate to obtain the predictive distribution
or the new supplier in the form of a Negative Binomial distribu-
ion with parameters ( ˆ  α + n i , ˆ β + t i ) . Since we only have informa-
ion from assessments obtained at initial contracting for the new
upplier, we have no data on the number of non-conformances
i.e. n i = t i = 0 ). Fig. 4 (b) shows this predictive distribution for the
umber of non-conforming parts per annum conditional on the oc-
urrence of at least one such event. The conditional distribution al-
ows us to illustrate the thick tail of the distribution which would
therwise be dominated by the outcome of zero non-conformances
ince this probability is estimated to be 0.57 for this data set. The
ecay of the tail of this conditional distribution is slow, implying
hat there is a signiﬁcant risk of many non-conforming parts being
elivered by the new supplier given our current state of knowledge
bout quality obtained from the pool. 
.3. Optimal investment in supplier quality improvement 
So, how much should the company be willing to invest to im-
rove the quality performance of the new supplier given prior lev-
ls of epistemic uncertainty? 
Using Eq. (3.6) we ﬁnd that the optimal investment to improve
he quality of the new supplier is 15 . 85 v when the effectiveness
ate of an improvement activity is γ = 0 . 1 , meaning that we would
xpect to invest up to nearly sixteen times the buyer loss of a non-
onformance in improving supplier non-conformance rate. If the
ffectiveness rate of an activity is γ = 0 . 5 , then the optimal value
f investment decreases to 6 . 40 v . Consistent with Proposition 1 ,
e ﬁnd that optimal investment in improvement activities of the
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Fig. 4. (a) Prior distribution of uncertainty in the true non-conformance rate and (b) predictive distribution of number of non-conforming parts conditional on at least one 
non-conformance for the new supplier. 
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Table 2 
Quantiles and mean of optimal proﬁts distribution un- 
der perfect information (in units of v ) for new suppli- 
ers to commodity group. 
Statistic Effectiveness of learning activity 
γ = 0 . 1 γ = 0 . 5 
Quantile 0.5 0 0 
0.75 0 6.02 
0.90 88.71 113.63 
0.99 915.39 956.78 
Mean 43.53 49.29 
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pew supplier is lower for higher effectiveness rates. Note that the
xpected proﬁts are 22 . 97 v and 40 . 44 v , respectively. 
However, these are expected proﬁts. Above we noted the pat-
ern of variation shown in the prior distribution. If the true non-
onformance rate of the new supplier is low (i.e. realised from the
eft hand tail of the empirical prior distribution) then there re-
ains a risk that a loss will be incurred by implementing the im-
rovement activity. For example, if the true non-conformance rate
s λ < 0.05 for an effectiveness rate of γ = 0 . 1 then the probabil-
ty of making a loss is 0.51; whereas if λ < 0.15 for γ = 0 . 5 then
he probability of making a loss is 0.46. We highlight these insights
ecause they allow managers to appreciate the level of risk asso-
iated with making an immediate investment in supplier improve-
ent given prior uncertainty. 
We can further examine the relationships between the effec-
iveness rate, optimal investment and expected proﬁt, given the
rior epistemic uncertainty as illustrated in Fig. 5 . Fig. 5 (a) shows
he optimal investment and expected proﬁt proﬁles, which are
oth zero until the effectiveness rate is above the investment
hreshold. Beyond this point, the expected proﬁt increases mono-
onically with the effectiveness rate at a diminishing marginal rate
f increase. Expected investment is highest at low effectiveness
ates then decreases as the effectiveness rate increases, implying
hat the higher effectiveness requires less investment to improve
roﬁts. In Fig. 5 (a) the expected proﬁt function is constrained to
e zero for low values of the effectiveness rate, unlike the surface
lot shown in Fig. 5 (b) where the zones of expected loss and proﬁt
an be identiﬁed. When effectiveness rate and optimal investment
ncrease, the expected proﬁt is highest. However, as optimal invest-
ent and/or effectiveness decrease, so too does expected proﬁt,
ith high investment and low effectiveness resulting in expected
osses. 
.4. Value of learning more about the supplier before investing in 
mprovement 
So, should the company invest in activities to learn more about
upplier quality to reduce the epistemic uncertainty about the true
on-conformance rate? When the effectiveness rate γ = 0 . 1 , we ﬁnd the expected
alue of perfect information, that is the difference between the
VPI and the expected proﬁt under prior uncertainty, to be 17 . 05 v .
his implies that if the buyer judges it is worth spending up to
ust over seventeen times the loss incurred by a supplied non-
onformance part to remove uncertainty about quality perfor-
ance then the best decision is to conduct additional learning be-
ore investing in an improvement activity. When the effectiveness
ate is γ = 0 . 5 , the expected value of perfect information reduces
o 5 . 44 v . 
We can further examine the likely ﬁnancial consequences of
pistemic uncertainty for the true quality performance of the new
upplier. Table 2 shows selected quantiles and the mean of the
istribution of optimal proﬁts under an assumption of perfect in-
ormation corresponding to no epistemic uncertainty. The results
resented in Table 2 indicate that investment in improvement is
ot optimal for a large proportion of suppliers new to the com-
odity group because we ﬁnd the optimal proﬁt is zero. How-
ver it is clear from values of the quantiles, and especially from
he relationship of the median to the mean, that this distribu-
ion is right skewed implying there is a small chance the new
upplier will merit relatively large investment. For example, 1% of
uch new suppliers to the commodity group would beneﬁt from
n investment at least 900 times the value of a non-conforming
art. 
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Fig. 5. Relationship between expected investment and optimal proﬁt, given a range of effectiveness rates for supplier improvement activity. Note in (a) solid is expected 
proﬁt and dashed is optimal investment and in (b) blue is expected proﬁt and red is expected loss. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the 
reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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p  4.5. Implications of epistemic uncertainty for decision-making 
Through our modelling we aim to support supply chain man-
agers to make informed decisions. Our goal is not to make the op-
timal decision itself. For this reason, we have presented a selec-
tion of results that are both typical of those shared with managers
in the manufacturing company and illustrate the behaviour of the
model for different inputs. We summarise our key results in rela-
tion to the basic modelling concept shown in Fig. 1 . Let us consider
the situation where the supply chain manager is concerned with
an improvement activity which has an effectiveness rate judged
to be γ = 0 . 5 . Our analysis indicates that the manager should be
willing to invest up to 5 . 44 v to remove the epistemic uncertainty
about the true non-conformance rate. If the costs of gathering ad-
ditional information to learn more about supplier quality exceed
5 . 44 v then the supply manager might decide to invest up to 6 . 40 v
directly in the improvement activity. 
So far, our analysis has only considered the degree of epistemic
uncertainty at the two extremes: either as estimated by the em-
pirical prior distribution; or totally removed. To further help the
manager develop an understanding of the impact of the degree
of epistemic uncertainty on optimal investment levels for supplier
improvement, we can also examine the impact of changing the
prior standard deviation. Fig. 6 shows changes in the expected op-
timal investment under perfect information as the standard devi-
ation increases from zero through to 200, which is just above the
estimated prior standard deviation of 164.71. We also examine four
cases of changes in the prior mean around the point estimate of
48.83 to explore part of the conﬁdence region. As previously, we
consider effectiveness rates of 0.1 and 0.5. We ﬁnd that regard-
less of the effectiveness rate, the expected optimal investment as
a function of prior standard deviation is consistently less for lower
prior mean. For equivalent prior mean and standard deviation, the
expected optimal investment is lower when effectiveness rate is
higher. 
In our industry example, the managers know the real value of
the loss incurred by non-conformance and, based on their procure-
ment knowledge, have informed opinions about the likely effec-
tiveness rate of an improvement activity as well as the associated
cost. Our analysis provides them with a means of expressing their
f  ncertainty about supplier quality evidenced by their data and al-
ows them to investigate options for supplier development and for
nformation seeking activities with an understanding of the inher-
nt risks to inform their decision. 
. Discussion 
Our research has been motivated by engagement with industry
ractice and addresses an important academic topic on the value
f information in supplier development. Consequently we believe
e have developed a modelling framework that is both useful to
upply chain managers and makes a scientiﬁc contribution. Our
ractical motivation has led us to frame a distinctive decision prob-
em where we focus upon the buyer’s dilemma of investing in
ctivities to develop supplier quality performance and we aim to
ake effective and eﬃcient use of available industry data, both
mpirical and judgemental. Hence we have presented a modelling
olution that ﬁlls a gap in the literature between the management
onsiderations of the supplier development process and the sci-
nce of mathematically modelling abstract decision problems us-
ng, for example, stochastic programming or game theoretical ap-
roaches. 
.1. Conclusions and contributions 
Practically, our modelling process has proved valuable to the in-
ustry practitioners with whom we have been collaborating since
hey need to allocate their limited resources to a range of devel-
pment activities in the context of an extensive number of suppli-
rs. Importantly, by focusing on the expected value of perfect infor-
ation we help to quickly identify those new suppliers for which
here will be no economic beneﬁt in obtaining any further infor-
ation before the actual improvement investment and those oth-
rs for which further information is essential. This type of decision
id is critical for prime companies with large supply bases. 
Scientiﬁcally, our major contributions and insights are as fol-
ows. We provide closed form solutions for the optimal level of in-
estment and expected proﬁt under no and perfect information.
e establish that the optimal investment level in supplier im-
rovement does not have a monotonic relationship with the ef-
ectiveness rate of that activity. Through Theorem 1 we have pro-
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Fig. 6. Relationship between the expected optimal investment under perfect information and the prior standard deviation as measure of epistemic uncertainty when effec- 
tiveness rate is controlled to be (a) γ = 0 . 1 and (b) γ = 0 . 5 . 
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t  ided distribution-free results on the relationship between mean
ptimal investment levels and uncertainty of the prior distribu-
ion. Mean investment level before the learning stage will inform
udgeting, as it provides a prediction on the expected amount of
nvestment to a supplier that will be required post due-diligence.
e have shown that, ceteris paribus, we would reserve the least
mount of resources for the suppliers for whom we have the great-
st uncertainty. This may seem counter-intuitive as one might ex-
ect to reserve extra resources for improvement for those suppliers
bout which there is greater uncertainty. However, we stress that
he budgeting of reserves is made in advance of learning activi-
ies and the actual investment in the supplier will be determined
nly after further information has been collected. We provide an
nalytical expression for the EVPI that can be used to assess the
eneﬁts of learning more about supplier quality processes before
nvesting in improvement activities. We also derive and evalu-
te an approximation to the EVPI in the form of an upper and
ower bound, which supports practical computations within stan-
ard software, such as spreadsheets. By creating a visual represen-
ation of the relationships between expected proﬁt, effectiveness
nd optimal investment, and examining the distribution of optimal
roﬁt for a given rate of effectiveness, we can communicate the
mpact of uncertainty on the risks associated with making deci-
ions to managers, as shown in the industry example reported in
ection 4 . 
We reﬂect upon our insights in relation to the proposi-
ions made by Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig, Marucheck, and Metters
2007) mentioned in Section 2 . Although formed from an extensive
iterature review in the context of inventory management, these
ropositions also express more widely understood characteristics
f value of information, hence providing a suitable level at which
o consider the implications of our theoretical ﬁndings. Our mod-
lling framework is useful in situations when a decision is likely
o be sensitive to uncertainty since management support would
ot be required if (nearly) perfect information exists about the
rue non-conformance rate since the need to invest, or not, in a
upplier would be obvious. Therefore we are consistent with theroposition that sensitivity of the decision to uncertainty moder-
tes the relationship between the level of uncertainty and VOI. We
nd, although have not shown, that the expected value of per-
ect information increases as the prior variance increases, consis-
ent with the proposition that VOI will be larger when uncertainty
s greater. Learning activities are intended to reduce the epistemic
ncertainty from the prior level, but the rate of reduction will de-
end on the activity and so vary between activities. Better learn-
ng will be achieved when the prior distribution shifts in location
owards good or poor quality levels with less spread and this is in
ine with the proposition that the VOI increases with respect to the
evel of marginal information. Our approach is predicated upon the
iew that information has value if it has the potential to change
ecisions. Our effectiveness rate of a supplier improvement activ-
ty essentially provides a mapping from the current to an intended
uality performance state of the supplier and so corresponds to
 supplier’s ability to respond to buyer-led improvement activities
iven operating constraints. 
.2. Limitations and further work 
We have focused upon deriving analytical expressions for the
alue of perfect information in the context of supplier develop-
ent investment decisions. This presumes all epistemic uncer-
ainty is removed and so practically the expected value of per-
ect information only provides the supply chain manager with an
pper limit of how much to spend on learning. We can envis-
ge situations where the manager might consider various activ-
ties to learn about supplier quality, implying that reduction in
pistemic uncertainty about the true non-conformance rate might
ary according to the characteristics of different activities. Thus
e may obtain more, but not necessarily perfect, information.
ur modelling framework can accommodate this situation allow-
ng the manager to assess the levels of uncertainty associated with
he non-conformance rate following a learning activity to deter-
ine whether it is cost effective. However, we may be required
o use simulations to assess situations where partial information is
944 J. Quigley et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 264 (2018) 932–947 
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Fgained, learning is not perfect and residual epistemic uncertainty
remains. 
We have focused upon assessing the upper limit of a further
reduction in epistemic uncertainty because we were motivated by
the challenge posed by the industrial project. Our industry partners
were not concerned with the option of delaying key learning activ-
ities; instead they were interested in whether or not to implement
the learning activities, such as site visits and additional audits dur-
ing the early phase of supplier relations. Hence our focus has been
on obtaining the expected value of perfect information as an upper
limit for all further data gathering processes, which would include
real options. A real option approach to this problem would be in-
teresting to develop more formally and would be appropriate to
modelling partial information, insofar as another branch could be
added to the decision tree to represent a delay in the decision to
invest and to consider the NPV of the associated costs and beneﬁts
to such an alternative. 
We have focused upon decisions relating to a supplier newly
integrated to a company’s supply base in a context where the lead
times allow for both learning and improvement activities to be
initiated before the regular supply of parts starts. However, a re-
lated problem is that of developing existing suppliers with whom
the company has a past relationship. Conceptually, our Bayesian
stochastic modelling framework supports decisions regarding ex-
isting suppliers since it is possible to determine appropriate prob-
ability distributions using relevant historical data for the supplier
of interest. 
We have assumed a Gamma prior distribution. Our choice is
aligned with our underlying probability model, which is suﬃ-
ciently ﬂexible to represent many epistemic uncertainty scenarios.
We make the common assumption that non-conformances follow a
Poisson distribution. The assumptions support the mathematics of
the methods developed and can be validated using standard sta-
tistical model checks. However, now that our framework has been
articulated, a future challenge is to develop a wider class of proba-
bility models that might be suitable to capture different supplier
data patterns. This might be especially useful if we extend the
set of performance characteristics beyond quality to, for example,
late deliveries, or consider situations when there is anticipated im-
provement in supplier quality as might be expected for start-up
companies or new production technologies. 
The EVPI can be expanded to assess the value of learning about
the effectiveness parameter γ . Assessing the uncertainty about γ
may be complicated by the confounding effect of the supplier’s
willingness to engage in development activities. Additionally, when
there is value in knowing the effectiveness of an intervention prior
to engagement then learning about both the non-conformance and
effectiveness rates is needed to assess the net impact. Develop-
ing a bivariate model to simultaneously assess the EVPI for both
non-conformance rate and improvement effectiveness would al-
low the synergies of learning within activities and the depen-
dency between the uncertainties to be analysed. Modelling the
epistemic uncertainty in the effectiveness rate within the model
also presents additional challenges for elicitation of the prior. 
We express the buyer loss due to a non-conforming part sup-
plied as an unknown parameter, which is typical in the litera-
ture. For example, Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig, Marucheck, and Met-
ters (2007) ﬁnd that few studies in an inventory management con-
text report total costs of scenarios considered in value of infor-
mation analysis in the inventory context. We made this modelling
choice partly because of the challenge of accessing ﬁnancial data
and estimating such costs accurately, but also because we found
that expressing choices relative to this loss is more useful to sup-
ply chain managers since it accords with their practice on penal-
ties. There is a need to provide further guidance in the articulation
of these costs even if only for applications support, since we knowrom our theoretical and empirical work that they will also impact
he optimal decision. 
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ppendix A 
Let N i denote the number of non-conformances realised in the
 th future time epoch, v i denote the value of a non-conformance
ealised in the i th epoch, t i denote the exposure to risk in the i th
poch, and r denote the discount for one epoch. As before x is the
ne-off investment made at time 0 and γ is the effectiveness rate.
hen we can express the proﬁt expression in Eq. (3.4) as the NPV
f proﬁt, P , as follows 
 = 
∑ 
∀ i 
v i N i (1 − e −γ x ) 
(1 + r) i − x 
he expectation of P with respect to N i is given by 
 = 
∑ 
∀ i 
v i αβ t i (1 − e −γ x ) 
(1 + r) i − x = 
α
β
(1 − e −γ x ) 
∑ 
∀ i 
v i t i 
(1 + r) i − x 
hich can be re-expressed as shown below in the form consistent
ith the expression in Eq. (3.5) . 
[ P ] = α
β
(1 − e −γ x ) v t − x, 
here v t = ∑ ∀ i v i t i (1+ r) i . 
ppendix B 
Proof of Proposition 1 . 
 
∗ ≡
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
)
γ
, 
dx ∗
dγ
≡
1 − ln ( v tγ ) − ln 
(
α
β
)
γ 2 
 = γ
x ∗
dx ∗
dγ
= 
1 − ln ( v tγ ) − ln 
(
α
β
)
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
) = 1 
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
) − 1 
roof of Proposition 2 . 
First we establish the following expression which we use of in
he derivation of the proof: 
∞ 
 
1 
z j 
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
dz = ( α + j ) 
( α) 
(
β
v tγ
) j 
∞ ∫ 
1 
(
β
v tγ
)α+ j 
z α+ j−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α + j ) dz
= ( α + j ) 
( α) 
(
β
v tγ
) j 
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + j, β
v tγ
))
.
here F 
(
1 ;α + j, βv tγ
)
is the cumulative distribution function of
 Gamma distribution evaluated at 1 with shape parameter α + j
nd scale parameter βv tγ . 
Note that: 
 
(
1 ;α + j, β
v tγ
)
= 
(
β
v tγ
)α+ j 
e −
β
v tγ
( α + j ) 
∞ ∑ 
k =0 
(
β
v tγ
)k 
k ∏ 
k 1=0 
( α + j + k 1 ) 
. 
J. Quigley et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 264 (2018) 932–947 945 
Table C.3 
Ratio of logarithm of upper bound (UB) to true EVPI over simulated parameter ranges. 
Effectiveness rate γ Shape parameter range α Scale parameter range β Min ln ( UB 
EVPI 
) α value at min β value at min Max ln ( UB 
EVPI 
) α value at max β value at max 
0.1 [0.001,0.1] [0.001,0.1] 0.588 0.1 0.001 16.797 0.001 0.1 
0.1 [0.001,0.1] [0.1,1] 7.489 0.1 0.1 26.522 0.01 1 
0.1 [0.001,0.1] [1,10] 21.858 0.1 1 123.074 0.01 10 
0.1 [0.1,1] [0.001,0.1] 0.125 1 0.01 7.489 0.1 0.1 
0.1 [0.1,1] [0.1,1] 2.339 1 0.1 21.858 0.1 1 
0.1 [0.1,1] [1,10] 15.867 1 1 118.364 0.1 10 
0.1 [1,10] [0.001,0.1] 0.009 10 0.01 2.339 1 0.1 
0.1 [1,10] [0.1,1] 0.125 10 0.1 15.867 1 1 
0.1 [1,10] [1,10] 3.86 10 1 110.875 1 10 
0.5 [0.001,0.1] [0.001,0.1] 0.116 0.1 0.001 13.277 0.001 0.1 
0.5 [0.001,0.1] [0.1,1] 3.907 0.1 0.1 14.607 0.01 1 
0.5 [0.001,0.1] [1,10] 9.93 0.1 1 38.418 0.01 10 
0.5 [0.1,1] [0.001,0.1] 0.011 1 0.01 3.907 0.1 0.1 
0.5 [0.1,1] [0.1,1] 0.215 1 0.1 9.93 0.1 1 
0.5 [0.1,1] [1,10] 15.867 1 1 118.364 0.1 10 
0.5 [1,10] [0.001,0.1] 0.001 10 0.01 0.215 1 0.1 
0.5 [1,10] [0.1,1] 0.011 10 0.1 4.508 1 1 
0.5 [1,10] [1,10] 0.186 10 1 27.37 1 10 
0.9 [0.001,0.1] [0.001,0.1] 0.06 0.1 0.001 12.354 0.001 0.1 
0.9 [0.001,0.1] [0.1,1] 2.973 0.1 0.1 12.5 0.01 1 
0.9 [0.001,0.1] [1,10] 7.807 0.1 1 27.916 0.01 10 
0.9 [0.1,1] [0,0.1] 0.001 1 0.01 2.973 0.1 0.1 
0.9 [0.1,1] [0.1,1] 0.039 1 0.1 7.807 0.1 1 
0.9 [0.1,1] [1,10] 15.867 1 1 118.364 0.1 10 
0.9 [1,10] [0,001,0.1] 0 10 0.01 0.039 1 0.1 
0.9 [1,10] [0.1,1] 0.001 10 0.1 2.427 1 1 
0.9 [1,10] [1,10] 0.017 10 1 17.205 1 10 
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cow we derive the main result. Let Z = v tγ. Since a Gamma ran-
om variable is closed under scale transformation we can express
 ∼ Gamma 
(
α, βv tγ
)
. We seek the following: 
 Z [ E [ P ; x PI | Z ] ] = 
∞ ∫ 
1 
z − 1 − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
dz 
= 
∞ ∫ 
1 
(
z − 1 + 
∞ ∑ 
i =1 
( −1 ) i ( z−1 ) i i 
)
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
dz 
∞ ∫ 
1 
z − 1 + 
∞ ∑ 
i =1 
(−1) i 
i ∑ 
j=0 
( −1 ) i − j ( i j ) z j 
i 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
dz 
= 
v tγ α
β
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + 1 , βv tγ
))
− 1 + F 
(
1 ;α, βv tγ
)
γ
+ 
∞ ∑ 
i =1 
i ∑ 
j=0 
( i −1 ) ! 
( i − j ) ! j! ( −1 ) j 
( v tγ
β
) j ( α+ j ) 
( α) 
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + j, βv tγ
))
γ
hich gives an expression for the EVPI. 
Proof of Theorem 1 . 
The optimal level of investment under perfect information is
iven by X PI = max ( 0 , ln ( υtγ) ) . The expectation of X PI when the
on-conformance rate is known to exceed the threshold can be
xpressed as in the following. 
 
[
X PI 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
= ln ( υtγ ) + E 
[
ln ( ) 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
Consider the following Taylor Expansion of ln ( ) about
> 1 υtγ
= E 
[

∣∣ > 1 υtγ ], where  is a random variable de-ned on the positive real numbers with variance σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
=
 
[
(  − μ) 2 
∣∣ > 1 υtγ ]. 
n ( ) = ln 
(
μ> 1 υtγ
)
+ 
(
 − μ> 1 υtγ
)
μ> 1 υtγ
+ o 
((
 − μ> 1 υtγ
)2 )
∗
We make two observations: 
i) As ln ( ) is a concave function then we know ln ( ) ≤
ln 
(
μ
> 1 υtγ
)
+ 
(
−μ
> 1 υtγ
)
μ
> 1 υtγ
ii) Taking the expectation of both sides of ( ∗) results in the follow-
ing: 
E 
[
ln ( ) 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
= ln 
(
μ> 1 υtγ
)
+ o 
(
E 
[(
 − μ> 1 υtγ
)2 ∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
])
Re-arranging we have the following bound. 
n 
(
μ> 1 υtγ
)
− E 
[
ln ( ) 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
= o 
(
σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
)
. 
So from observation i) we know that 
 
[
X PI 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
≤ ln 
(
υtγμ> 1 υtγ
)
nd only achieves equality in the deterministic case, i.e. when
2 
> 1 υtγ
= 0 . 
From observation ii) we know that the expected investment de-
reases as uncertainty increases, i.e. as σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
increases. 
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 Proof of Proposition 3 . 
Following the derivation of Proposition 2 , we seek to ﬁnd: 
E Z [ E [ P ; x PI | Z ] ] = 
∞ ∫ 
1 
z − 1 − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
dz 
= 
∞ ∫ 
1 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
d z −
∞ ∫ 
1 
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
γ ( α) 
d z ≤
∞ ∫ 
0 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
dz −
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, β
v tγ
))
= v t α
β
−
( α) − ln 
(
β
v tγ
)
γ
−
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, β
v tγ
))
. 
Proof of Proposition 4 . 
The difference between the EVPI and the upper bound pro-
vided in Proposition 3 comes from integration over the range [0,
∞ ) rather than [1, ∞ ). As such, the error is given by: 
error = 
1 ∫ 
0 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
dz 
1 ∫ 
0 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
d z ≤
1 ∫ 
0 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 
(
1 − z 
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
))
( α) 
d z 
= 
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
1 ∫ 
0 
(
z α − z α−1 ln ( z ) 
)(
1 − z 
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
))
dz 
= 
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
1 ∫ 
0 
(
z α − z α−1 ln ( z ) −
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
)
z α+1 + 
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
)
z α ln ( z ) 
)
dz 
= 
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e −
β
v tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e −
β
v tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) . 
Appendix C 
The purpose of our numerical study is to understand the loss
of accuracy of the UB as an approximation to the EVPI. Hence,
we focus upon the region where the bound is likely to perform
poorly, informed by our theoretical results. Setting v = t = 1 , we
simulate combinations of the remaining parameters in the follow-
ing ranges: 0.001 ≤ α ≤ 1; 0.001 ≤ β ≤ 10; and for 0.1 ≤ γ ≤ 1.0.
Table C.3 summarises the results for effectiveness rates of 0.1, 0.5,
and 0.9, and selected 27 partitions of the parameter space for the
shape and scale parameters. Reported are the minimum and max-
imum values of the ratio of the UB to the EVPI in each partition.
More than 20,0 0 0 simulations have been run in total to calculate
these statistics. Lesser (greater) accuracy is implied when the log
ratio of the UB to the true EVPI is larger (smaller). By showing the
maximums and minimums of the log ratio over the controlled pa-
rameter intervals, we gain insight into the best and worst accuracy
within each simulation set. 
Our results show that the accuracy of the UB increases as the
shape parameter α increases, which is consistent with Corollary 1 .
In addition, the accuracy of the UB also increases for increasing
values of effectiveness rate, γ , and decreasing values of the scale
parameter β . Therefore, the upper bound becomes a poorer ap-
proximation as the effectiveness rate reduces and the values of the
scale parameter increases. This implies that for α > 1 and β < 0.1
then the error between the approximation given by the UB and the
true EVPI can be as high as a factor of 10. eferences 
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